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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN H. KLAS,

)

Plaintiff/
Appellant,

)
:
)

vs.

:

CASE NO. 900493-CA

)

MARK 0. VAN WAGONER and
KATHRYN VAN WAGONER,
Defendants/
Appellees.

:
)
)
)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO, JUDGE

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

THE APPELLANT
SO HAS SHOWN,
EVIDENCE DOES
CLUSIONS MADE

KLAS HAS MARSHALED HIS EVIDENCE AND BY DOING
AS WELL AS HAVING MET HIS BURDEN, THAT THE
NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONBY THE COURT.

B.

NOT ONLY DOES SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXIST TO SUPPORT THE
POSITION OF KLAS, AND THUS REFUTE THE POSITION OF THE COURT,
BUT IN FACT VIRTUALLY NO EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT SUPPORTS THE
COURT'S FINDINGS AND THE VAN WAGONERS' INTERPRETATION
THEREOF.

C.

THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES MUST BE ADDRESSED, THE FINDINGS OF THE
COURT NOT BEING SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.

D.

THE APPELLANT KLAS IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES, BOTH
FOR THE TRIAL BELOW, AS WELL AS THOSE FEES INCURRED IN THIS
APPEAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT KLAS HAS MARSHALED HIS EVIDENCE AND BY
THAT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS HIS POSITION THAT THE COURT WAS
IN ERROR IN ITS DECISION AND THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.

It should be stated at the outset that the Appellant Klas
has set forth in his brief a detailed statement of the facts,
with repeated references to the record and transcript,
his Statement of Facts as well as his Argument.

in both
Repeated

references are made as to the findings made by the court, how
those findings were later amended and in what respects, the testimony relied upon with regard to such findings, the exhibits
used, and the authorities relied upon by the court in formulating
its Findings of Fact which we here contest.

In his arguments,

Mr. Klas has repeatedly referenced the record and the transcript,
and has indicated where he believes the court has erred, as well
as those facts which support the findings.

Clearly, Mr. Klas

does not disagree with all of the court's findings and equally as
clear is the fact that Mr. Klas has cited numerous references to
facts which support correctly the findings made by the court.
It should be further noted that the actions by Klas in his
brief appear to be substantially different than those of the Appellant in Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P2d 927 (Utah, 1990), which
case the Van Wagoners rely upon in their argument that Klas has
not marshaled his evidence.

Clearly, Klas agrees with most of

the court's findings, and has done more than " . . . merely argue
that there is evidence contradicting them. . . .M (Ibid., at
931.)

Indeed, the Appellant's Brief is replete with references

to the findings and supporting facts.
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We also draw the Court's attention

to the fact that the

cross-appeal of the Van Wagoners 1 does no more to marshal the
evidence than does the Appellant, allegedly-

Indeed, we submit

that their efforts to marshal are substantially less than those
of the Appellant.
Furthermore, while the appellate courts of this state talk
about marshaling, we find guidelines given as to exactly what is
expected,

or at what point a party has crossed

the line in

providing sufficient evidence to constitute marshaling.
mit

that given

the lack of any such guidelines,

We sub-

and what we

believe is a substantial effort and full compliance by Mr. Klas,
the Van Wagoners 1

argument

that

we have not marshaled

the

evidence is without merit.
Finally, we submit that the nature of the proceedings in
this action
transcript

really

require a complete

by any appellate court.

reading of

This

the entire

is not a case with

redundant testimony, or endless witnesses testifying as to extraneous matters.

The witnesses are few, primarily involve the

parties to the action, and their testimony must be reviewed in
detail to really obtain a clear understanding of the evidence
which both supports and contradicts the findings of the court.
Given these facts it would be impossible to marshal all of the
supporting testimony.

Such a task would require many pages of

references and quotations from the transcript, and citations to
the testimony and record.

This would only create a burdensome

brief and would, in all likelihood, only serve to confuse rather
than clarify or marshal the facts supporting the findings.
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We, therefore, submit that we have met the marshaling requirement, and in fact, have done so to a much greater extent
that the Appellees themselves in their cross-appeal brief.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE
POSITION OF KLAS, DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE
COURT, NOR THE POSITION OF VAN WAGONERS, AND THEREFORE,
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED.
Central to the argument by Van Wagoners is their contention
that the Devere Kent appraisal was purposely kept from them, and
had they known of its existence they would never have bought the
home.

In support of this position, they cite Amended Findings,

No. 30 (R. 305), which states as follows:

"In the course of negotiations between the defendants and
Carol Klas, there existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing
the property at $165,000, the existence of which was unknown
to defendants, and if known, would have made a material difference in their offer to buy the subject property.
This
was a unilateral mistake on the part of the defendants which
was fundamental and substantial. The Devere Kent appraisal
was never provided by Carol Klas in spite of defendants1 request for copies of appraisals. In this regard, the Court
does not find any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of
the Plaintiff."
It is interesting, however, to note that the Van Wagoners
have cited virtually no references to the trial testimony to support this finding by the court.

In fact, they cite only five (5)

references to the transcript in their entire argument relative to
the central issue.
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Reference Number One.

They allege that Mrs. Van Wagoner

testified that during her first contact with Mrs. Klas she inquired as to the existence of any appraisals.
148.)

(Tr., Vol. II, p.

This is true.

Reference Number
Wagoners

that

Two.

she had

They claim Carol Klas told Van

three

"appraisal",

and

that

those

"appraisals" indicated a value of somewhere between $170,000 to
". . . $190 -- 1 or 3 or something, but it was above 190, but
just a little above 190."

(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 181-182.) {They cite

volume II in their first reference but mean volume I.}
also true, as far as it goes.

This is

But there are important qualifying

facts that need to be mentioned as well.
First
"appraisal".

is

the

issue

of what

Mrs.

Klas

defined

as

an

It is clear from the testimony that she considered

an appraisal anything from anyone that reflected their opinion of
the value of the property.

(Keep in mind that she was not ex-

perienced in real estate, was not a real estate agent, and saw
herself as ". . . involved in a decorative, more of a facilitator
way

. .

(Tr. Vol. II p.

90, Lines 9-10.)

She mentioned

"appraisals", but it is clear that she had no real idea what an
actual "appraisal" consisted of.
In her testimony, she describes the "appraisals" as follows:
"And I had mentioned that Mr. Payne of American Savings and
Loan had seen the home a year before and had drawn up some
type of a letter and had given this to Mr. Klas." (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 90, lines 18-21.) * * * *
"Howard Badger (ph.) had given an opinion to John, which
John had shared with me. Vic Ayers had given an opinion to
John. He had been through the home.
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"And I believe there was one other opinion that had been
raised, plus the fact that -- I just can't recall. I think
there was one other opinion. . . . " (Tr. Vol. II, p. 91,
lines 4-11.)"
The court's own findings (Finding No. 20, R. 302)
states:
"However, defendants negotiated with plaintiff through Carol
Klas pursuant to paragraph 4 above and pursuant to plaintiff
and Carol Klas1 understanding the range would be the value
of the three highest "appraisals". (Emphasis added.)
Thus, we see that Carol Klas referred to four appraisals, to
wit:

that of Mr. Payne, Howard Badger, Vic Ayers and " . . .

other opinion . . . ."

one

The Court, itself, found that the range

would be based upon the three highest appraisals, (R. 299, Finding No. 20) and the term appraisals was in quotes ("appraisals"),
implying that the term was used loosely and primarily was used
according to what Carol Klas understood an appraisal to be.
299, Finding No. 7.)

It was found that it was dispute as to

whether there were written appraisals.
Reference Number 3.
Klas " . . .

(R.

(R. 299, Finding No. 7.)

They refer to the allegation that Carol

told the Van Wagoners that those appraisals indicated

the home had an appraisal
$175,000 to $192,000."

market

value of

somewhere

(Appellee's brief, p. 17).

between

The court

found that John and Carol Klas were basing their asking price in
part on the three highest appraisals, and bear in mind the Defendants' conclusions and argument

on this matter

rest on the

limited knowledge and understanding of Carol Klas, not only as to
the nature of an appraisal, but generally what was being used to
support the value.
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Carol Klas testified that she ". . . did not know a great
deal about the background of hoe he {John Klas} arrived at this
but I could share with him what John had told me."

(Tr. Vol. II,

p. 90, lines 10-12. )
Kathryn Van Wagoner testified as follows:

"Q. In that visit to the home, did the subject of appraisals come up?
"A.
Yes.
Once again, we asked, 'Do you have any
appraisals?1
She had a fact sheet but from that time, that
initial time she let us know that John had the mechanics of
the deal. He had the paperwork.
I understood that Carol was interested in selling the
house. I did not know that they were getting a divorce until she told me the night before. So, obviously the situation was a delicate one, and she was cooperative and helpful. But she said, 'You will have to talk to Mr. Klas. Mr.
Klas has those papers. I don't have access to any of those.
John has relayed this information to me and I am just telling you what I know.'"
(Emphasis added.) (Tr. Vol. II, p.
150-151, lines 20-25, and 1 to 7.)
It was clear that she didn't have a great deal of background
knowledge and that if they wanted more information on MappraisalH
they would have to obtain that from Mr. Klas.
on was what Mr. Klas had told her.

All she was going

The court found that "at no

time did the plaintiff make any misrepresentations to defendants
regarding any appraisal

made on the property and no misun-

derstanding existed on the part of the plaintiff with reference
to the nature and extent of any appraisals. . . . "

(R. 304, Find-

ing No. 26) We refer the Court to pages 11 through 20 of Vol. I,
Transcript of Proceedings, wherein the Court will find that not
only did Mr. and Mrs. Klas rely upon these three "appraisal", but
an abundance of other factors and information which Mr. Klas used
to help determine the value of the property.
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Indeed, Mrs. Klas

at one point expressed her concern that she thought his suggested
asking price of $175,000 to $180,000 was too low- (Tr. Vol. I, p.
19, lines 1-2)
Reference Number 4-

They refer to Tr. Vol. II, p. 42, lines

1-14, which reference they use to support their allegation that
the Klas1 had M. . . kept hidden . . . " (Appellees1 brief, p. 17)
the Devere Kent appraisal.

(Emphasis added.)

However, this one

reference in no way supports such an allegation.

There is ab-

solutely nothing whatsoever in the entire transcript of proceedings, nor anything at all in the record which supports their allegation that the Kent appraisal was ever hidden, or in any way
or manner kept from the Van Wagoners.
Indeed, the Findings of Fact made by the court, cited above,
clearly point out that at no time did Mr. Klas ever misrepresent
anything to the Van Wagoners, nor was there ever any misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Klas as to the nature or extent of
any appraisals.

(R. 304, Finding No. 26)

One must also note the

chronological context in which the Van Wagoner appraisal requests
were made.

Their requests were made after Van Wagoners had made

their offer on the home, after the Earnest Money Sales Agreement
was signed by both parties, and after Van Wagoners had had every
opportunity to —

first, either ask for any "appraisal" which Mr.

Klas had, or in the alternative, obtain their own.
do neither.

They chose to

What they did do, however, is both interesting and

instructive as to their supposed reliance upon any appraisals.
This is illustrated by the testimony of Mrs. Klas as to what ac-
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tions the Van Wagoners took to examine,

inspect and become ac-

quainted with the home, prior to the offer.

We refer the Court

to the following testimony of Mrs. Klas:

M

Q. Did there come a point in time subsequent thereto
when you were later contacted by the Van Wagoners relative
to the presentation of a formal offer?
"A.

Oh, yes.

"Q.

When did that happen?

"A. This would have been, I would say a few days after
the 26th. {Of July}
M

Q. In the interim, before you met with them, did anything happen from the standpoint of people coming to the
home to go through it in behalf of the Van Wagoners, such as
architects or people of that nature?
M

A. Yes, a series of people. I mean, there seemed to
be people like electricians, architects, decorators, a whole
series." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 94, lines 8-21.)
And what did they do after the offer had been accepted?
Again, we refer the Court to the testimony of Mrs. Klas.
"And I said, fWell, will there be anyone coming over to look
at the property?1
And I think in my mind I was going back
to my own experience of having someone from a bank when you
are taking a loan to come in and look at in an appraisal
situation.
"And she said, 'No, go ahead. We have no trouble with that.
I don't believe there will be anyone coming.'"
(Tr. Vol.
II, p. 104, line 4-11.) (Emphasis added.)
From these testimony examples alone, it is clearly evident
that

the Van Wagoners had every opportunity to either have the

home appraised on their own, or inspect any "appraisals" in the
possession of Mr. Klas.

They did neither.

They saw fit to have

architects in, decorators, and all kinds of other people, but
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never anyone to appraise the home to verify its value.

The home

was clearly open for their use by such experts, but they never
availed themselves of the opportunity.
And finally on this point,

we cannot emphasize enough the

mischaracterization by the Van Wagoners in their brief that Mr.
Klas had "kept hidden" any appraisal.

Indeed,

this allegation

flies directly in the face of the very clear findings of the
court.

The court found no fraud, no misrepresentations, not even

a misunderstanding on the part of the Klas'.

Their allegation of

hidden appraisals is simply not true, and unsupported by a single
reference in the record or their brief.
Their

fifth

and

final

reference

to

the

transcript

of

proceedings refers to Vol. I, p. 181, lines 19-25, and p. 182,
lines 1-12.

This testimony by Mrs. Klas states that, according

to the best of her knowledge, which was admittedly

limited, Mr.

Klas had three "appraisal" ranging from $170,000 to a little over
$190,000.

This is true.

He did have three "appraisals", or

perhaps statements would be more accurate, with this range of
values.
had.

But she never said these were the only appraisals he

She also stated Mr. Klas wouldn't take anything outside

this range.
M

.

This is also true.

As she indicated, mr. Klas was

. . looking for a very substantial offer."

(Tr. Vol. I, p.

185, line 5.)
But we must remember that a person is entitled to ask anything he or she wishes for the sale of their property, and can
rely upon anything that he or she may wish in formulating a sales
price.

We have already noted above that Mr. Klas testified at
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length, in page after page of testimony from the transcript cited
above, as to the many factors that he considered in determining
the value.

There is no indication that the relied solely upon

these three "appraisals".
praisals knows full well

Anyone familiar with real estate apthat you can have many difference ap-

praisers and come up with many different values.
hid the Ken appraisal.

He obviously didn't

reflected the true value of the property.
it in determining his asking price.

Mr. Klas never

feel it accurately

He did not rely upon

It may have been too dated,

it may have been used for other purposes initially, or it simply
in his mind, based upon the abundant other information he relied
upon, did not accurately reflect the value of the home.

He had

three "appraisals" and he was entitled to rely upon them.

The

fact situation does not mandate that Mr. Klas reveal every appraisal ever done on the home.
Our Supreme Court has stated

in the case of Park Valley

Corp. v. Baaley, 635 P2d 65,67 (Utah, 1981), that:

"The trial court's ruling runs counter to an important principle which is a common thread running through many of the
decisions of this Court. That principle is that sellers and
buyers should be able to contract on their own terms without
the indulgence of paternalism by the courts in the alleviation of one side or another from the effects of a poor bargain. They should be permitted to enter into contracts that
may actually be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship
on one side."
Mr. Klas chose from a variety of elements to determine his
sale price,

the three highest

These were his terms.

"appraisals" being among them.

These formed the basis for his asking

price, as well as his acceptance of the Van Wagoner offer.
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This

now brings us to one very critical point that has never been addressed by the Van Wagoners in their brief, and that is the "no
exceptions" provision of the contract between the parties.
The court in its Findings

(R. 303, Finding No. 23) found

that:
"The defendants knew that the plaintiff would not approve of
any 'conditions1 or 'exceptions1 to the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement at the time of its execution and delivery to the
plaintiff and were advised that if they desired to purchase
the property, the purchase would have to be on the basis
that there were no contingencies, exceptions, or conditions
of sale other than as set forth in the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement."
This finding is borne out by various points of testimony.
For example, in Mr. Van Wagoner's testimony at Tr. Vol. I, p.
196, lines 5-8, he testified as follows:

M

A.
* * * I mean, it was intended to be a no exception offer for $175,000.00.
"Q.

And that's what you intended.

"A.

Yes."

Given this fact, that the agreement, event the offer in and
of itself, were intended to be without exceptions or conditions,
we can only ask why any appraisal

is relevant to the case.

If

the Van Wagoners intended their offer or the agreement to be subject to any conditions whatsoever,

including the existence, ex-

amination or accuracy of any "appraisals", regardless of their
nature, then that condition or exception should have been made a
part of the agreement.
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It is manifestly clear that the Earnest Money Sales Agreement constituted an integrated contract, and parol evidence is
admissible only to show circumstances under which the agreement
was made, or if there is a showing of fraud (which the court expressly found to be absent

{R. 305, Finding No. 28}), or some

similar exception which permits the use of parol evidence.

See

for instance Bullfrog Marina v. Lentz, 501 P2d 266 (Utah, 1972).
No such exception is present

in this case.

Indeed, it is ad-

mitted by the Van Wagoners that they knew full well that there
were to be no exceptions or conditions, and prior to signing the
agreement, they had every opportunity, as found by the court, to
investigate the issue of fair market value of the property. (R.
303, Finding No. 22)
From all of

this,

several

things

are clear.

The Van

Wagoners1 brief only cites five (5) factual references, most of
which have little real meaning, and which lend little or no buttressing to their position.

Carol Klas admittedly had little

knowledge of real estate or the "appraisals".
the three highest
elements

Mr. Klas did use

"appraisals", as well as a plethora of other

in determining

the value of his property.

The Van

Wagoners had every opportunity to examine the appraisals, or have
the property
agreement.

independently appraised prior to their signing the

They did nothing.

They knew full well that the offer

and the final, accepted agreement were without exceptions or conditions of any sort.

Mr. Klas was free to choose whatever fac-

tors he desired in determining his asking and acceptance prices,
and absent some type of fraud or misrepresentation the agreement
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should stand.

Furthermore, the court specifically found no mis-

representations of any sort, no fraud, and that the Van Wagoners
had every opportunity to appraise the property or examine the appraisals prior to signing the agreement.

As stated, they did

neither.
The Van Wagoners 1 brief specifically alleges that the appraisals were hidden from them.
ported and contrary

But this is not true, is unsup-

to the evidence and

the findings of the

court.
This brings us to the next requirement to maintain a defense
based upon unilateral mistake, that being that

M

the mistake must

be of so grave a consequence that to enforce the contract as actually made would be unconscionable."
320, at 326, (Utah App. 1990).

Grahan v. Gregory, 800 P2d

We have already mentioned the

Park Valley case, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that a fair
amount of latitude should be permitted to parties entering into
contracts, free from the intrusions and
courts.

"paternalism"

of the

In light of the Grahan and Park Valley cases, we submit

that the showing of severity of consequences should be so extreme
that the contract is unconscionable on its face, or in light of
even the most obvious or readily available facts.
Much has been made of the allegedly "missing" Devere Kent
appraisal for $165,000. (R. 305, Finding No. 30) The agreed upon
sales price was for $175,000.
ference between

We question whether a $10,000 dif-

the sales price and one "appraisal" could be

termed "grave" or "unconscionable"?

It cannot.

And this is so

particularly in light of the price of the home and the fact that
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there was an abundance of other evidence valuing the property
higher.

But let's assume, for argument's sake, that the Kent ap-

praisal was the only one existing.

It is clear from the whole

testimony of not only Mrs. Klas, but both of the Van Wagoners as
well,

that

badly.

these people wanted

the home,

and they wanted it

Mr. Van Wagoner is an attorney, and has experience in

real estate law, and had been the owner of a home himself.

Cer-

tainly, he had some idea in his mind as to whether or not his offering price fell within the general realm of what the home might
be worth.

Given this highly probable knowledge on the part of

both of the Van Wagoners, they made the offer, asked for no appraisals, and entered into a no exceptions or conditions contract
without having the property first appraised, or the "appraisals"
examined.

The fact of the matter is that the sales price is not

unconscionable.
Wagoners

" . . .

The court
considered

specifically

found

that

the Van

the price of $175,000 as being a

reasonable price for the property.

. . . M (R. 305, Finding No.

31) What the court never found or concluded was that the difference in the $175,000 contract price and the Devere Kent appraisal, or any other for that matter, constituted grave circumstances, the enforcement of which would be unconscionable.
This finding being absent,

the Van Wagoners have clearly failed

to fulfill one of the requirements established by this Court to
sustain a defense of unilateral mistake.
their brief

They merely mention in

(P. 19) that it would be unconscionable to enforce

the contract, but cite no reasoning or authority to sustain such
a conclusion.
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Furthermore, we question the court's finding that the three
"appraisals" ranged from $175,000 and up as found by the court.
(R. 299, Findings No. 5 & 7) There is abundant testimony that
from at least the Van Wagoners' and Carol Klas' understanding,
the appraisals ranged from $170,000 and up, and not $175,000.
(See, for example, Tr. Vol. I, p. 93, line 18; p. 181, line 25;
Vol. II, p. 22, lines 17-18; Vol. I, p. 181, lines 19-25, and p.
182,

lines 1-12.)

If they understood the range to start at

$170,000, we question even more strongly how the Kent appraisal
at $165,000 could be considered an unconscionable and substantial
difference.
We also draw the court's attention to the testimony of Mr.
Van Wagoner at Tr. Vol. II, p. 63, lines 17-21, wherein he indicates that there had been a proposal subsequent to the subject
Earnest Money Sales Agreement wherein Mr. Klas had offered to
sell the subject property for $161,000; $4,000 below the $165,000
Devere Kent "appraisal" as found by the court. (R. 298, Finding
No. 5) Given this testimony, we question how the court could find
that had the Van Wagoners known of the Devere Kent appraisal it
". . . would have made a material difference in their offer to
buy the subject property.

This was a unilateral mistake on the

part of the defendants which was fundamental and substantial."
(R. 305, Finding No. 30) The credibility of their position is
further weakened by the testimony of Mr. Van Wagoner at Tr. Vol.
II, pp. 71-72, lines 1-25 of P. 71 and lines 1-7 of p. 72,
wherein he indicates that they weren't interested in the $161,000
possible sales figure, but, rather, were more concerned, and
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governed by, their own independent appraisal of $173,000.

We

submit that the court was in error, therefore, in making a finding that

the lack of knowledge of the Kent appraisal had a

material impact upon their desire to buy the home.

How can this

be when they even refused a possible sale below that of the Kent
appraisal?

We further submit that the difference between the

Kent appraisal and the sales price, as well as the difference between the Kent appraisal and the lowest appraisal as the Van
Wagoners apparently understood it, ($170,000) were not of such a
difference to be considered in any way unconscionably palatable.
They must also show that the mistake occurred ". . . notwithstanding

the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party

making the mistake."

Grahan v. Gregory, supra, at 327.

Their

sole reply to this critical element was one sentence (Appellees'
brief, p. 19), wherein they assert that " . . .

the mistake oc-

curred despite defendants* requests for appraisals which would
have avoided

the mistake."

This

is wrong.

Nowhere

in the

transcript of proceedings is there any indication that the Van
Wagoners attempted to obtain the "appraisals" at any point in
time prior to their executing the Earnest Money Sales Agreement
with Mr. Klas.

We refer the Court, for example, to the testimony

of Mr. Van Wagoner

at Tr. Vol.

II, pp.

18-23, wherein

he

describes the offering and acceptance process the parties went
through.

There are other places where such testimony is present,

but this will serve to indicate that the Van Wagoners never made
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an effort to obtain and examine any "appraisals" prior to their
submitting their offer.

They never made any effort to have the

property independently appraise, or otherwise determine if the
asking price was in keeping with the apparent or true value of
the home.
Furthermore, the Van Wagoners had lived in the same neighborhood since July of 1980. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 90, lines 1-2) Mr.
Van Wagoner had lived in another home with his prior wife which
they owned that was situated approximately two blocks from the
subject property

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 12, lines 13-15), and he had

sold that home as a result of his divorce in 1985, and entered
into the subject agreement

in August of 1986.

Certainly,

once

could reasonably assume that Mr. Van Wagoner had some idea as to
the value of properties in the subject neighborhood.

Certainly,

Mr. Van Wagoner must have had some idea as to the value of the
subject property, whether or not the value fell within what might
be reasonable for the type of home and the location.

With his

profession, his probable knowledge of real estate values in the
area, his involvement with real estate law, we find it impossible
to believe that the Van Wagoners have exercised anything that
could ever remotely be characterized as ordinary diligence.
When Mr. Van Wagoner was asked why he hadn't

inserted any

conditions into the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, he replied
that he had two reasons.

The first was that since he and Mrs.

Klas had both been through divorces he trusted her as to the appraisal values

(keeping in mind that she had in fact been in-

formed that there were three "appraisals" in the range she indi-
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cated to the Van Wagoners), and second, Mr. Klas was a difficult
person to work with.
cuses.

We submit that these are not sufficient ex-

We submit that these reasons do not rise to the level or

ordinary diligence, particularly with any an attorney who had
lived in the same neighborhood for six years and within a few
blocks of the subject property.
The final

issue to prove unilateral mistake involves the

necessity of placing the other party in status quo as he stood
prior to the agreement, except for the loss of his bargain.

They

assert that the Appellant, Mr. Klas, was placed in a status quo
position because the contract had been rescinded and he was in
the same position as he had been prior to the agreement.

First,

they are in error in contending that the agreement had been rescinded.

The court made no such finding and they cite absolutely

no authority or finding by the court to substantiate this position.

What the court found was unilateral mistake, and not res-

cission.
Secondly, as we pointed out in our initial brief, had the
agreement been honored by Van Wagoners, Mr. Klas would only have
had to pay a 3% finder's fee to his former wife.

But due to

their breach, he had to subsequently pay a 7% real estate commission, resulting in an additional loss of $5,950, which amount we
are seeking in additional damages from this Court.
CONCLUSION OF POINT II
While our discussion has been lengthy, we feel it has been
necessary to illustrate where the findings and the position of
Van Wagoners lack credible evidence to support their positions.
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Their entire position rests on the court's finding of unilaterla
mistake.

We have gone through each

[point and shown that they

have failed to factually support any of the points necessary to
prove unilateral

mistake.

These people knew what

they were

doing, or should have known, the difference between the sales
price the Kent appraisal is not of an unconscionable nature, they
have failed to exercise ordinary diligence, and they have not
left Mr. Klas in a status quo position.

The only error, if there

is one, is that they failed to take steps and ask questions that
would have provided

them with information that supposedly might

have altered their opinion about the home, but event that is conjectural.

Had they seen the Kent appraisal prior to their offer

they still may have offered

$175,000.

evidence that they really wanted this home.

It is clear

form the

So much so, in fact,

that they lost little time in making an offer, and were apprehensive they would not obtain the home prior to another party.

Bear

in mind, as well, that the Kent "appraisal" was not one of the
three appraisals upon which Mr. Klas was making his offer.
Indeed, Mr. Klas relied upon a variety of other factors in determining his asking and acceptance price.

In addition,

there is

absolutely no evidence to support their position that the Kent
appraisal was "hidden" from the Van Wagoners.

the court made no

such finding and the appraisal was eventually provided sometime
shortly after the requests by Mr. Van Wagoner, which requests and
the providing of the "appraisal" both came after the agreement
had been signed by the parties.
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Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the offer made was intended to be, and was required to be, without exceptions or conditions.

This being the case we fail to see how any appraisals

at that point could be relevant.

Accordingly, we submit that the

court erred in ruling that unilateral mistake had occurred that
would permit the Van Wagoners from escaping their responsibility
under the subject agreement between the parties.
POINT III
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ITS INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF
DAMAGES, AND IN THE EVENT THIS COURT RULES IN FAVOR OF
MR. KLAS, THE DAMAGES DUE THE APPELLANT NEED TO BE
CLARIFIED BY THIS COURT.
The Van Wagoners1 brief argues that since the court did not
err, there is no need to reach the issue of damages; but they
argue that if the Court sees fit to reach that issue in the event
of a reversal, they claim that the damages claimed are
purely speculative. . . . "

M

•

• .

for

the

(Appellees' brief, p. 23.)

We have already argued

that

there

is no basis

court's award of only $7,500, and its failure to award the difference that had to be paid in real estate fees for the sale.
is readily apparent

that had the Van Wagoners bought

It

the home,

Carol Klas would have been paid a 3% finder's fee, as set forth
in their Decree of Divorce.

This is without dispute, and there-

fore, certainly not in the slightest degree speculative.
Second, as the court's first Memorandum Decision points out,
the property sold for $160,000 (R. 143) (see also Tr. Vol. I, p.
45, lines 3-4) after the Van Wagoners failed to perform, leaving
a difference in the two sales prices of $15,000.
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These facts are

also undisputed.
that

It is hardly speculative or hypothetical to see

the difference between the two sales prices

is an exact

figure, readily ascertainable, and thus the correct measure of
damages.
Accordingly, we submit that the damages due in this matter
is the difference between the sales prices of $15,000, plus the
difference in the real estate sales fees, or $5,950, for a total
damage amount to Mr. Klas of $20,950, plus interest.

We, there-

fore, request that this Court, in the event it rules in favor of
Mr. Klas, specify and direct the correct damages due to the Appellant .
POINT IV
APPELLANT, MR. KLAS, IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEY'S FEES
FOR THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW, AS WELL AS FEES INCURRED
FOR THIS APPEAL.
In the event

this Court rules

in favor of Mr. Klas, the

issue of attorney's fees incurred for both the proceedings in the
lower court and the proceedings before this Court arises as an
issue and under the terms of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement,
we submit that Mr. Klas is entitled to those fees.
we request

Accordingly,

that this Court render as part of its opinion the

rights of Mr. Klas to attorney's

fees in the two different

proceedings.
CONCLUSION
We have already spoken at length as to the merits of the
central issue of the case, that being unilateral mistake.

In our

opinion, the Van Wagoners have clearly failed to fulfill all of
the requirements of a unilateral mistake defense, bearing in mind
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that all elements of such a defense must be satisfied.
do not sustain the critical

The facts

findings of the court below and we

submit that the opinion should be reversed.
We also submit that Mr. Klas is entitled to damages in the
amounts specified, said amounts being the differences between the
sales prices and the real estate fees that were involved, versus
those that would have been present had the Van Wagoners performed.
Finally, we submit

that Mr. Klas

is entitled

to his

reasonable costs and attorney's fees for both the lower court
proceeding and the proceedings before this Court.

We feel that

the issue concerning marshaling of evidence has been adequately
addressed, and that Mr. Klas has complied fully with that requirement.

Certainly as much,

in not more so, than the Van

Wagoners in their own cross appeal.
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JOHN H. KLAS,

)
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Appellant,

)
:
)

x

vs.

Case No. 900493-CA

)

MARK O. VAN WAGONER and
KATHRYN VAN WAGONER,

:
)
•

Defendants/
Appellees.

)
:
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT TO CROSS APPEAL OF APPELLEES
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO, JUDGE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In the Appellant's initial brief on appeal, he has already
set forth his position as to the facts in this case.

The Van

Wagoners have likewise set froth their statement of facts as they
saw them.

Those facts were further elaborated upon in the argu-

ments and Mr. Klas' reply brief.

We, therefore, rely upon the

factual statements as they have already been argued.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

THE ARGUMENTS OF VAN WAGONERS IN THEIR CROSS APPEAL ARE
FLAWED BECAUSE EACH ONE RELIES UPON THE ASSUMPTION THAT
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND CAROL KLAS TO BE THE AGENT OF
JOHN KLAS.

B.

THE ACTIONS OF JOHN KLAS NOT ONLY DID NOT CONSTITUTE FRAUD,
BUT THEY DIDN'T EVEN RISE TO THE LEVEL OF MISREPRESENTATION.

C.

JOHN KLAS DID NOT MAKE ANY MISREPRESENTATIONS TO THE VAN
WAGONERS, EITHER PERSONALLY OR THROUGH CAROL KLAS.

D.

THE ARGUMENT OF VAN WAGONERS THAT THERE WAS BOTH FRAUD
AND UNILATERAL MISTAKE ARE CONTRADICTORY ARGUMENTS. THEY

MUST RELY UPON ONE OR THE OTHER, BUT THEY CANNOT RELY
UPON BOTH.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CAROL KLAS WAS NOT THE AGENT OF JOHN KLAS AND
THERE WAS NO FINDING BY THE COURT TO THAT EFFECT.
Basic to the arguments set forth in the cross appeal of the
Van Wagoners is their contention that Carol Klas was the agent of
John Klas, her former husband.
argument

The most obvious defect with this

is that the Van Wagoners cite not a single finding by

the court, point of authority, nor a single reference to the
transcript that evidences the existence of an agency relationship.
In our examination of the record and the transcript of
proceedings, we find no real effort made on the part of the Van
Wagoners to adduce any evidence or basis to indicate that an
agency relationship existed.

There was no questioning during the

trial of the witnesses on this point, no argument to this effect
in the record,

and no finding by

the court

that an agency

relationship existed.
It is well settled that an agency relationship exists where
a party acts for and represents the principal " . . .
quires his authority from him. . . . "
554.)

and who ac-

(2A CJS Agency, Sec. 4, p.

Our Supreme Court has followed this reasoning,

adding

that:
"In general, the determinative question has usually been
posed as one of 'control1, the view being that if the defendant controls, or has the right of control, the manner in
which the operations are to be carried out, the defendant is
liable as a master, while, if the control extends only to
the result to be achieved, the actor is regarded as an inde-

pendent contractor, and the defendant is liable under
neither respondeat superior nor the workmen's compensation
statutes." Foster v. Steed, 432 P2d 60, 62 (Utah, 1967).
From whence, then, did Carol Klas derive her authority to
sell the home?

Not from John Klas.

She acquired her authority

from the court pursuant to the Decree of Divorce.
p. 81, lines 11-12)

(Tr. Vol. II,

The only control John Klas had was to accept

or reject any offers.

He didn't even set the sales price.

(R.

298, Finding No. 4)

But the right to sell the home and to

receive a "finder's fee" was granted to Mrs. Klas by the Third
District Court in the Divorce Decree, and not from John Klas.
Indeed, John Klas had moved out of the home and Mrs.Klas continued to reside in the home until the time the Van Wagoners were
to perform.

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 80-81, lines 21-25 and lines 1-5)

The Van Wagoners, on the other hand, offer no evidence whatsoever
as to the existence of an agency relationship.

Under the terms

of the Decree she was granted by the court the right to find a
buyer and to receive a fee for doing so, with the attendant
responsibilities and rights to show the home, care for it during
the time it was up for sale, and in general, to find a buyer.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 82, lines 1-13)
Again, the Van Wagoners offer no evidence, nor do they offer
any authorities, that would indicate the existence of an agency
relationship.

The Van Wagoners even admitted that they made no

effort to inquire into the extent of her authority under the
Decree of Divorce.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 105, lines 10-13)

Further-

more, as stated, the court did not find that an agency relationship existed.

In fact, the assertions of Van Wagoners of an

agency relationship are so lacking throughout the proceedings
that one could virtually claim that the matter has been raised
for the first time in this cross appeal.
The net result of this is that John Klas cannot be held
responsible for the acts of Carol Klas due to the lack of agency,
this includes the preclusion of a finding of fraud, since he was
admittedly not involved in any representations or negotiations
directly and personally with the Van Wagoners.
It might also be appropriate at this point to reiterate our
argument in our reply brief as to the issue of marshaling of
evidence.

We find the Van Wagoners1 cross appeal brief to be to-

tally lacking in any effort to marshal evidence.
than any efforts made by the Appellant.

Much less so

There is clearly very

little effort made to set forth factual data from the trial that
supports their various contentions of agency, fraud, etc.

The

net result of this omission on their part is that they basically
have nothing more than bare bones allegations concerning all of
the points made.

Their arguments are so lacking in factual and

legal support that we submit that there is no basis to alter or
over turn the court's rulings pertaining to the issues of fraud,
agency, and misrepresentation.
POINT II
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A FINDING OF FRAUD.
The Van Wagoners cite Finding No. 30 of the Amended Findings
(R. 305) to support their contention that there had been a false
representation of a material fact:
"In the course of negotiations between defendants and Carol
Klas, there existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing the
property at $165,000, the existence of which was unknown to

the defendants, and if known, would have made a material
difference in their offer to buy the subject property. * * *
The Devere Kent appraisal was never provided by Carol Klas
in spite of defendants1 request for copies of appraisals."
We are at a loss to see how these actions, if believed and
take at

face value,

representation.

support

a conclusion

of fraudulent

mis-

We have already pointed out in our prior brief

that Carol Klas had no real understanding as to the nature of an
appraisal.

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 90)

The court even found that it

remained disputed as to whether or not
written appraisals existed.

it was represented

(R. 299, Finding No. 7)

that

Carol Klas

also testified that she didn't know a great deal about the background of the value information,

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 90, lines 10-

20), and that she didn't have access to any of the appraisal information and that she informed Van Wagoners they would have to
obtain that information from Mr. Klas.

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 150-

151, lines 20-25 and 1-7)
In light of these facts, i.e., that she informed the Van
Wagoners that she didn't have a great deal of knowledge about the
background on the value, and that she didn't have access to any
appraisal

information,

and that

they would have to obtain this

from Mr. Klas, how can one claim that she did anything to induce
them to act based upon false representations, or even omissions.
They cannot.

They knew that the information concerning value was

in the possession of Mr. Klas, yet they did nothing to try and
obtain that information prior to signing the papers.
Furthermore, there is a serious question as to how important
the appraisal
testified that:

information really was.

Mr. Klas, for example,

"Carol called me and said that Mrs. Van Wagoner had said to
her that she did not know why we were fooling around with
all this business of appraisals because that was not
relevant to the matter and they wanted the home and they
would appreciate her vacating it as soon as possible." (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 34, lines 7-12)
Of critical importance in maintaining a claim of fraud is
the issue of reasonable reliance.

Given all of the above, and

more, is it any wonder that the court concluded

that no mis-

representations had been made, let alone fraud, and based its
relief to the Van Wagoners solely on the ground of unilateral
mistake.
mine

It is well settled that it is up to the court to deter-

whether

or not

there had

been

reasonable

reliance.

(Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P2d 798, 801 {Utah,
1980}.)

We have, in our prior reply brief, argued at length con-

cerning the failure of the Van Wagoners to act in a prudent manner before signing the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, and whether
or not the knowledge of "appraisals" even formed a basis for
their intent to purchase the home.
other

knowledge

available

We have argued concerning the

to the Van Wagoners

property values in the neighborhood,

the actual

relative

to

representations

made by Carol Klas to the van Wagoners, their intense desire to
purchase the home, and other facts that would all indicate a total lack of fraud or misrepresentation on anyone's part.
Furthermore, even

if the Van Wagoners had obtained the

"appraisals" from Mr. Klas,

it is without dispute that

those

"appraisals" used by Mr. Klas ranged from $170,000 to $192,000.
If they had spoken with him, he would have informed them__as to
the

range

of

these

appraisal

values,

the

"appraisals" and from whom he had obtained them.

nature

of

the

The net result

would have been that the three highest of these "appraisals" did
in fact have the range Carol Klas had
Wagoners.

indicated

Clearly, there was no deception here.

to the Van

The fact that a

fourth appraisal, which was not hidden as they claim, lowered the
range of "appraisals" another $5,000 would not seem to make any
difference.

The bottom line is that John Klas based his value on

both the three highest "appraisals", as well as the copious other
facts available to him which we have previously set forth in some
detail in our other reply brief.
In their cross appeal brief, the Van Wagoners argue that
they

followed

the

requirements

set

forth

by

the Court

in

Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Anderson, 610 P2d 1369 (Utah, 1980)
to protect themselves by asking " . . .
any appraisals on the home."

Carol Klas if there were

(Cross Brief, p. 25)

We submit

that this simple inquiry does not measure up to the standard required by the Court.

In the Sugarhouse case, the Court, at p.

1373 states as follows:
"Misrepresentation may be made either by affirmative statement or by material omission, where there exists a duty to
speak. Such a duty will not be found where the parties deal
at arm's length, and where the underlying facts are
reasonably within the knowledge of both parties. Under such
circumstances, the plaintiff is obliged to take reasonable
steps to inform himself, and to protect his own interests."
This really is the crux of the whole case.

Did the Van

Wagoners, who were without dispute, dealing at arm's length, take
reasonable steps to inform themselves as to the appraisal values
and to protect their own interests.

They did not.

We ask, what

purpose is there in asking about appraisals, in order to verify
their existence, their accuracy and other content.

A mere in-

quiry does not rise to the level of protecting one's interest,
particularly when Carol Klas clearly in her testimony indicated
that she had little knowledge of the nature, number or content of
any "appraisals", and informed the Van Wagoners they would have
to obtain that information from Mr. Klas.

If that

information

was so critical why did they wait until after the agreement had
been signed and they were seeking bank financing to ask for the
appraisals?

The answer is that the existence and accuracy of the

appraisals were not material

to the offer, but rather, the Van

Wagoners only sought them out when it came time to obtain their
financing in order to avoid the cost of obtaining another appraisal.

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 35, lines 13-24)

In the above referenced testimony, Mr. Van Wagoner makes it
clear that he only wanted the appraisals for obtaining his loan,
and was not using them as a basis in determining whether or not
to make his offer.

His offer had already been made and accepted.

When he could not obtain the appraisals from Mr. Klas as quickly
as he wanted, he asked the bank about another appraiser and went
through that person to obtain his appraisal for the bank.
We see nothing in these actions that would indicate that the
Van Wagoners were taking steps of any type to inform themselves
prior to making the offer, and without this information, how can
they claim they were reasonable in their actions to protect their
own interests.

Furthermore,

the Court will note in the entire

context of Mr. Van Wagoner's dealings with Mr. Klas, that Mr.
Klas was anything but difficult.

While he was unable to provide

the information as quickly as Mr. Van Wagoner wished, he was

friendly, and we submit, made a reasonable effort to comply with
Mr. Van Wagoners* requests for appraisal information, and did in
fact supply that information*
From the foregoing, we submit that it is readily apparent
that there was no fraud by anyone involved with this transaction.
The central fact is that the Van Wagoners badly wanted the Klas
home and the existence, content, and accuracy of any appraisals
was secondary and of little importance.

They obviously and ad-

mittedly felt the home was worth what they offered, they had information upon which to base their knowledge of value other than
the appraisals, and were more concerned that someone else would
buy the home before they did.

If the home was really worth sub-

stantially less than the $175,000 offered, which we dispute,
their failure to verify the value can only be characterized as
recklessness on the Van Wagoners1 part, and not fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Mr. Klas.

Negligence on the part

of the Van Wagoners is the issue here, and not any act or omission on the part of John Klas or anyone connected with him.
Their claim for fraud should, therefore, be dismissed and the
court's finding of a lack of fraud upheld.
POINT III
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR OVERRULING THE COURT'S RULING
THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MISREPRESENTATIONS
MADE BY JOHN KLAS.
The Van Wagoners' claim of misrepresentation uses the same
reasoning as their claim of fraud, and rests entirely upon the
assumption that Carol Klas was John Klas' agent.

We have argued

already at length that Carol Klas was not his agent.

She acted

virtually independently, derived her authority from the court under the Decree of Divorce, and Mr. Klas 1 only involvement was
whether or not to accept the offers presented to him.

There was

no principal-agent relationship between John and Carol Klas.
There were no misrepresentations made directly by John Klas.
They admit, or rather, never even contend,

that John Klas ever

made any factual representations to the Van Wagoners.
They contend that there was a fourth, much lower appraisal
which would have altered the Van Wagoners1 decision.

This is not

only conjecture as to the possible influence it might have had,
but

it is not a "much lower" appraisal.

The court found the

range to start at $175,000, but we argued in our other brief that
the testimony
$170,00.

indicated

that

the range more

likely

ran

from

In either case, the Devere Kent appraisal was $165,000.

This would make the range $165,000 to $192,000.

An offer of pur-

chase at $175,000 is hardly out of line, or to the detriment
which they have suffered?

We contend that there is none.

They go through the motions of citing to the Court the elements of fraud and/or misrepresentation, but fail to show how the
Van Wagoners acted to their detriment.

They have failed to show

that a purchase of $175,000 was so out of

line as to be un-

conscionable and thus to their detriment if enforced.
They also ignore, as cited in our other brief, the fact that
Carol Klas indicated a possible fourth appraisal.
quire into this possible additional appraisal.
Did she fail to disclose it?
praisal much lower?

She did not.

It was not.

Did they inThey did not.

Was the Kent ap-

Was the Kent appraisal among

the three highest "appraisals" upon which John Klas, in part, was
relying in determining his selling price?
made clear

It was not.

It was

that John Klas was relying on the three highest

"appraisals" in setting his value.

We will not belabor these

points further since they are discussed in much greater detail in
our other reply brief.

Suffice

it to say,

that

the court's

ruling that there had been no fraud nor any misrepresentation was
clearly correct, and well supported by the testimony and the exhibits received at trial.
CONCLUSION
If there is a failure to marshal evidence in this case, it
lies with the Van Wagoners.

Their support

from the transcript

and record of their cross appeal claims, as well as their rebuttal brief, are substantially lacking.

Their claims of fraud and

misrepresentation do not bear up under scrutiny.
not John Klas1 agent.

Carol Klas was

They were grossly remiss in their in their

duty to inquire into the nature and accuracy of the appraisals.
They did absolutely nothing to protect

themselves,

proceeded

quickly to present an offer to stave off the possibility of the
home being bought by another party, and only finally got around
to inquiring about the appraisals when they needed them for obtaining their loan, and not for the purpose of verifying

the

value of the property, or for the purpose they should have made
of them, to wit:

to aid in establishing and verifying value

prior to making their offer of purchase.

We, therefore, submit

that their cross appeal relief should be denied, and that the appellant

should

be awarded

his attorney's

fees

incurred

responding to the Van Wagoners' cross appeal in this matter.
DATED this

day of May, 1991.

BRANT H. WALL
Attorney for Plaintiff

in
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